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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a wave of privatization has reversed the trend of
nationalization and state-owned enterprises characterizing many developing
nations, particularly those making the transition from a centralized autocracy
to a market economy, such as the Republic of Guyana. This high-level policy
reversal can be partially explained by the nature of state enterprises.
Historically, state enterprises are not as profitable as those within the private
sector, are notoriously inefficient, and often stifle the development of private
enterprises and thus overall economic growth. When nationalized industries
failed to thrive domestically or internationally, national governments began
looking for more productive alternatives, further motivated by the rapidly
changing nature of the international economy.
Although the fundamental concept of privatization is consistent throughout
the world, the goals, procedures, and substantive challenges of the
privatization process differ according to the needs of the particular nation.
However, the variations within the privatization process seem to be delineated
along lines corresponding to levels of industrialization. That is, developed
nations face common privatization challenges that are very distinct from the
difficulties of privatization encountered by developing nations. This Comment
attempts to highlight some of the difficulties inherent in the privatization
process of formerly autocratic developing nations, through the example of the
Privatisation Unit of the Republic of Guyana.
II. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES OF PRIVATIZATION IN DEVELOPING NATIONS
Although privatization is generally regarded as a successful measure in
developed, fully industrialized nations, the process has encountered major
challenges common in many developing nations. Oftentimes, these difficulties
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are the result of preexisting structural conditions that render the country
particularly susceptible to the rigors of the requirements of privatization.
Among the structural elements acknowledged to be necessary for a successful
privatization process are: clear, consistent, and broad objectives articulated by
the government; few initial limitations (external or internal) being placed on
the privatization process; and a stable domestic economic structure that lends
itself to the development of the private sector. Further political and legal
challenges center around the need for specific legislation that clearly defines
the rules of privatization; a system authorizing and regulating the entire
process of privatization; a clear institutional framework to conduct the
transfers; and an acknowledgment of sector-specific difficulties. Like many
developing nations, Guyana has struggled in some of these areas, sparking
concerns about the foundation upon which its wave of privatization is built.
Clear statements articulating the fundamental goals of a nation's
privatization process are not as readily available as one might think, especially
in nations that historically operated under command economy principles and
are transitioning from the strictures of a socialist economy into a market
democracy. In such an environment, the government was not required to
articulate any economic policies to the population at large, let alone provide
justifications and rationales for their actions, to the extent necessary in a
market democracy. However, the move toward market democracies has
encouraged the governments of developing nations to increase the transparency
of government plans as well as accountability to the people. In Guyana, the
recently promulgated National Development Strategy (NDS) has provided a
clear objective: to "privatize everything," although this strategy has yet to be
adopted in such broad terms in internal legislation or government statements.2
The process of privatization will also suffer if, at the outset, external and
internal limitations exist that may hinder the process. External limitations may
consist of bilateral or multilateral treaties with other nations or international
entities. In the case of Guyana, external entities such as the Carter Center, the
World Bank, and IMF have encouraged privatization; in fact, it is often a
prerequisite measure Guyana must meet before receiving international aid.
Internal limitations can be constitutional or statutory. The Constitution of
Guyana states that "[t]he existence of privately owned economic enterprises
is recognized. Such enterprises must satisfy social needs and operate within
2 National Development Strategy of Guyana, available at http:llwww.guyana.orglNDSI
NDS.htm.
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the regulatory framework of national policy and the law."3 While hardly a
strong display of support for private enterprise, it appears to pose no legal
limitation on the privatization of state enterprises in Guyana. To date, no
explicit statutory limit exists on the privatization efforts of the Government of
Guyana.
The basic economic structure of the nation will also directly affect the
success of privatization efforts. If a nation has not developed rules defining
and protecting ownership and ensuring fair competition among economic
actors, privatized enterprises are not likely to succeed. Potential investors,
both domestic and foreign, will be wary of participation in economic ventures,
particularly those that were barely profitable under the protection of the state.4
In Guyana, recent economic reforms, such as a structured tax incentive system,
have improved the economic stability and investor potential in the country.
Independent entities like the Guyana Office of Investment (GOInvest)
encourage the development of new business ventures, and courts are quickly
gaining experience with corporate matters and privatization procedures.
Further reforms encouraging the development of a strong private sector are
anticipated; if enacted, they will greatly ease the privatization process as well
as Guyana's full transition to a market democracy.
III. SINGH V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GUYANA
Such challenges to the privatization process are common to many
developing countries. However, in analyzing the difficulties unique to
Guyana, it is helpful to consider a current case that raises many issues in the
ongoing privatization initiatives in Guyana. In the summer of 2003, the case
of Singh v. Attorney General of Guyana' surfaced in the Ministry of Legal
Affairs. The case involved the privatization of the Guyana Pharmaceutical
Corporation (Old GPC), and exemplifies many of the difficulties faced by
developing nations struggling to legitimize and successfully execute their
privatization processes.
In 1982, the Government of Guyana ordered the compulsory acquisition of
a family-owned building known as Sijan Plaza.6 At the time, Sijan Plaza was
3 Guy. CONST., chap. 2, art. 17.
4 Guislan, supra note 1, at 45.
3 Action No. 2733 of 1997 (still pending).
6 Under the Acquisition of Lands for Public Purposes Act, the government is entitled to
acquire any property so long as it is a defeasable estate to be used for a public purpose and the
owner received a hearing and adequate compensation. In the instant case, the government seized
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
leased to the state-owned Old GPC, on whose behalf the government seized
Sijan Plaza. Before the disputed takings claim was resolved, the government
formally transferred Sijan Plaza to the direct ownership of the tenant Old GPC.
The Privatization Unit of Guyana then initiated privatization proceedings on
Old GPC. The state enterprise Old GPC was dismantled and eventually
reincorporated as the private, share-owned New GPC. Under the procedures
of the Privatisation Unit, all assets of Old GPC, which included Sijan Plaza,
were to be transferred to a government holding agency, the National and
Industrial and Commercial Investment, Limited (NICIL), until arrangements
could be made for New GPC to formally acquire the property. Under the
rationale of the Privatisation Unit, New GPC would therefore be able to claim
Sijan Plaza as a corporate asset from its inception, thus boosting its initial
public offering.
Thus, beyond the basic eminent domain claim, the plaintiff sought
determination on whether the government, in the form of the Privatisation
Unit, could seize property based on the public interest in successfully
privatizing a state enterprise. Furthermore, the plaintiff questioned the
legitimacy and authority of the procedures of the Privatisation Unit in
transferring disputed assets of a previously state-owned enterprise to a third
party (NICIL) without the consent of any of the parties involved. Although the
Privatisation Unit eventually sought the permission of the Attorney General of
Guyana for the transfer of Sijan Plaza to NICIL, such a measure did not
diminish the significance of the issues raised. The case questioned the very
authority of the Privatisation Unit, along with the legitimacy of its procedures
and substantive guidelines; thus, it provides a useful framework for analyzing
the difficulties in the privatization process in Guyana.
IV. THE PRIVATIZATION CHALLENGE IN GUYANA
A. Political Challenges
One of the most critical aspects of privatization is the institutional
framework implementing the privatization process and the supporting
governmental structures. In Guyana, the Privatisation Unit is an executive
agency, technically a branch of the Ministry of Finance. The Unit is housed
the property for the public purpose ofprivatizing a state enterprise; the plaintiff then brought suit
claiming deficient grounds of acquisition and questioning the constitutionality of the
government's valuation process.
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in a separate structure several blocks from the Ministry of Finance, although
its director answers to the Minister of Finance. The Privatisation Unit operates
with some degree of autonomy, although it works in close conjunction with
NICIL, which holds and operates all industrial estates in Guyana, including the
assets of state enterprises.
The structure of the executive branch of government with which the
Privatisation Unit interacts further affects the legal process of privatization.
Most government ministries (including the Privatisation Unit) do not directly
employ any attorneys. Thus, the parliamentary and state counsel within the
Ministry of Legal Affairs are charged with acting both as internal legal advisor
to each ministry and as a legal check on other ministries and branches of the
government. This conflict of interest often creates tension between the
Ministry of Legal Affairs and other government ministries, since the state
attorneys at the Ministry of Legal Affairs are required to advise and protect
government ministries as their "clients," and yet also to discover and prosecute
legal violations within the government.7
This particular problem was evident in the Singh case. The Privatisation
Unit sought to legitimize its transfer of Sijan Plaza to NICIL and New GPC
after the fact, via permission from the state counsel at the Ministry of Legal
Affairs. When the request was formally conveyed, the Ministry of Legal
Affairs faced a direct conflict of interest. While the Ministry of Legal Affairs
is charged with providing sound legal advice to the Privatisation Unit as
official government counsel, many of the attorneys felt that the Privatisation
Unit was abusing its grant of authority from the Ministry of Finance, thereby
creating too strong of an executive branch of government. Under the current
Guyanese Constitution, the doctrine of separation of powers is not a strongly
established tradition. Therefore, in many instances, the Ministry of Legal
Affairs provided the only check on the growth of executive power. However,
in order to exercise this check, state attorneys are forced to ignore their duty
to serve as effective legal counsel to other ministries. When compelled to
choose between the two courses of action, the officials of the Ministry of Legal
Affairs opted to fight what they perceived as the unconstitutional growth of an
executive agency-thereby depriving the Privatisation Unit of internal legal
However, in reality, the Ministry of Legal Affairs is rarely consulted before employees of
other ministries officially act on behalf of the Government of Guyana, including entering into
contracts, signing treaties, and incurring international obligations. Thus, the Ministry of Legal
Affairs usually provides legal advice to other ministries after a problem has arisen. This situation
contributes further to the tensions between the various executive branches of government.
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counsel that would fight for its objectives within the government. Such
institutional, and inherently political, challenges pose a distinct obstacle to the
privatization process.
B. Legal Challenges
One of the primary legal privatization challenges that the Government of
Guyana has faced is establishing the proper legal authority for the Privatisation
Unit. The Constitution of Guyana, as amended, does not explicitly provide for
the creation of a Privatisation Unit; it does, however, authorize the
establishment of various executive ministries. The Privatisation Unit thus
exists as a semi-independent agency under the strictures of the Ministry of
Finance, created by the Ministry of Finance, and answering to the Minister of
Finance.
In addition, the establishment of clear substantive laws that determine the
rules for the privatization of state enterprises and resolve any legal questions
that may arise during the privatization process is essential. This stability,
consistency, and predictability is crucial for the success of privatization. This
issue arose in the Singh case when the Privatisation Unit attempted to
unilaterally transfer Sijan Plaza to NICIL. When challenged by the plaintiff,
the Privatisation Unit sought the permission of the Attorney General.
However, in the course of this inquiry, major questions arose regarding the
applicable law and thus the legitimacy of the action.
The Privatisation Unit sought to act solely on the executive authority
inherent from its creation within the Ministry of Finance. Under this view, the
consent of the Attorney General (which was not mandated in the Constitution,
the Laws of Guyana, or under any legal precedent) served as the only legal
authority for the transfer. This more flexible, results-oriented approach would
allow the Unit considerable unsupervised authority on the transfer of assets of
a state enterprise, and, more generally, on all privatization procedures, while
rendering the Attorney General susceptible to any claims arising out of the
privatization measures. The Privatisation Unit asserted that such flexibility
and adaptability of the law for the sake of the national public interest in
privatization was worth a short-term sacrifice of consistency and predictability
in the law.
The Ministry of Legal Affairs claimed that traditional company law,
governing the winding-up of any corporation, was the relevant body of law,
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and thus sought to apply the Public Corporations Act.' Despite the daunting
and unique political, economic, and legal difficulties facing Guyana, the
Ministry of Legal Affairs argued that the British common law system upon
which the legal system of Guyana is based required application of the relevant
company law precedent, even if such application hindered the privatization
process. Under the Public Corporations Act (PCA) investigation, the state
attorneys at the Ministry of Legal Affairs discovered some discrepancies in the
transfer process.9 Under the PCA, the process of privatization should begin as
any other winding-up of a corporation, state-owned or otherwise: with the
official appointment of a liquidator. Only such a liquidator of Old GPC would
have the authority to transfer the corporate asset of Sijan Plaza first to an
escrow account (that the building might be properly valued for the purpose of
compensating the plaintiff) and then to NICIL, which could effect the transfer
to New GPC at its discretion. Here, no liquidator was appointed; the only
acting authority was the Privatisation Unit.
As the named defendant in the Singh case which would be liable for any
damages awarded, the Attorney General's Chambers clearly could not sanction
such an avoidance of the dictates of the law. However, the Ministry of Legal
Affairs also did not possess the legal authority to formally sanction the
Privatisation Unit, mandate a change in its actions or policies, or even dictate
the applicable law. Thus, the Ministry of Legal Affairs took two actions: first,
recommending that the Privatisation Unit seek the permission of the National
Assembly for its action," and second, requesting that NICIL and/or the
Privatisation Unit be substituted as a defendant in the Singh case for the
Ministry of Legal Affairs. In this manner, the issue of the substantive law to
apply in privatization cases as well as the scope of the authority of the
Privatisation Unit, was put before the National Assembly, the most democratic
government institution in Guyana.
The Singh case also illustrates another legal difficulty in the privatization
process in Guyana. Since privatization is a relatively new endeavor in Guyana,
there is inevitably some uncertainty regarding the nature, scope, and
enforcement of privatization law. Thus, it is an area within which government
corruption is able to thrive, often a holdover from the days of autocracy. Since
LAws OF Guy., ch. 19:05 (1988) (as amended 1991).
'Personal notes of the author.
10 This request was pursuant to § 9 of the Public Corporations Act (Act No. 21, 1988), which
states that "[tlhe Minister may by order, which shall be subject to negative resolution of the
National Assembly, dissolve a corporation."
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the Ministry of Legal Affairs often serves as the primary investigator of the
government, it is often policing the actions of the very ministry it is required
to advise on the same matter. In the Singh case, the Ministry of Legal Affairs
discovered disturbing facts about the privatization of Old GPC. Although New
GPC was ostensibly a private corporation, share-owned by the Guyanese
people, further investigation revealed that ninety percent of the shares of New
GPC were in fact held by Queens Atlantic Investment, Inc., a foreign
corporation that was outside the jurisdiction of Guyana. Although
incorporated outside of Guyana, Queens Atlantic Investment, Inc. was owned
by the same handful of Guyanese investors that controlled the shares of NICIL
that were offered publicly in order to increase governmental transparency and
accountability to the people of Guyana. In the view of the Ministry of Legal
Affairs, the transfer of Sijan Plaza from Old GPC to NICIL to New GPC was
a transfer in name only; the building never actually left the control of the same
group of government officials. Thus, the uncertainties inherent in the
complexities of privatization often provide loopholes for government
corruption which the Ministry of Legal Affairs is not always authorized to
handle. Such illegal activity undermines the legitimacy of the process as well
as its eventual success.
C. Practical Challenges
These substantive challenges would be difficult to overcome in any legal
environment; however, this process is even more challenging in an under-
resourced developing country. The Ministry of Legal Affairs is primarily
charged with providing legal guidance to the Government of Guyana.
However, only a few CD-ROMS of the Laws of Guyana (promulgated by the
Carter Center) exist in the Ministry and no recording system exists for the
compilation of judgements and establishment of precedent. The Ministry's
policing of other executive agencies, although not its primary focus, is of great
importance both with the government and the nation. Here again, however,
these duties are rendered significantly more challenging by the lack of
investigative resources, the holdover attitude from earlier regimes against
interagency cooperation, and lack of transparency throughout the government.
Administrative resources are also at a premium, such as computers, printers,
runners, copy machines, and human resources. These practical challenges
affect both the Privatisation Unit as well as the Ministry of Legal Affairs,
which inevitably affects both the substantive functioning of the Privatisation
Unit and the Ministry of Legal Affairs.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite these immense challenges, the Government of Guyana has
successfully privatized many of its national industries. Among the most
prominent recent privatization examples are the Guyana Sugar Corporation
(Guysuco) and the telecommunications sector (GT&T). The litigation
surrounding the privatization of Old GPC, which is still pending, will be a
critical test of the both the Privatisation Unit itself and the privatization
process in Guyana.

